// Encrypted messenger · Variant C — zero hint

Everything else
is redacted.

No phone number. No email. No accounts. Your key is any file, password or link — and it never leaves your device. The server only ever sees noise.

NO IP · NO LOCATION NO REGISTRATION OFFLINE KEY EXCHANGE AES-256-GCM SHAMIR QUORUM
// What makes it different

Cryptographic access control.
No server-side permissions.

Who reads what is decided entirely by who holds the key — never by an account, a role, or a list on our side. We couldn't hand over your conversations if we tried.

Your key is anything

A password, any file (PDF, photo, MP3), a URL — or a Shamir split across several files. It's hashed locally and never transmitted.

No accounts, ever

No phone number, no email, no username. Your identity is a keypair that lives only on your device — never on our servers — and you share it with a contact only when you choose, by scanning in person.

Per-message encryption

Every message can use a different key. The same room looks different to each person — some lines are text, others are just .

The server is deaf

It stores opaque blocks and timestamps — nothing else. No senders, no key hints, no "who talks to whom". Seized, it reveals noise.

Quorum decryption

Lock a message so it only opens when K of N people combine their keys. One infiltrator with one share is useless.

Offline key exchange

By default, keys are exchanged offline — in person, by file, or by QR scan — never negotiated over the network. That eliminates an entire class of man-in-the-middle attacks.

// How it works

Three steps. Zero trust in us.

01

Generate locally

Your identity and keys are created on-device and stored encrypted behind your biometrics. Nothing leaves without a deliberate decision.

02

Share a key offline

Agree on a key with the people who matter — a file you both have, a password, a QR scanned in person. Never through the server.

03

Everything else is redacted

Anyone without the key sees a locked block — or, in stealth rooms, nothing at all. No error, no hint, no oracle.

Choose how each conversation is protected — three levels, no default →

// Defense in depth

Layers, not promises.

Security that survives a bad day is layered — and honest about where each layer ends. Here's ours, and what each one does (and doesn't) do for you.

Tor, bridges, or clearnet — you choose

Reach the network over Tor v3 (the server never learns your IP or where you are), over Tor bridges where Tor itself is blocked, or over a standard connection when hiding your location isn't the point. The app states plainly what each mode reveals — the choice, and the trade-off, are always yours.

Trust you can verify

A key you swap face-to-face can't be tampered with — you watched it happen. Set one up remotely when you can't meet, and the app marks it as such, with a fingerprint to verify later. Trust is shown, never assumed.

You're never both online at once

Messages wait, encrypted, until you reconnect — even across a dropping Tor circuit. Neither of you has to be online at the same moment for a message to land.

ygoow — what we don't pretend.txt
Encryption protects what you write.
Tor hides where you are.
Quorum splits the power to unlock.

// But no messenger — none — survives a compromised device.
// A phone with spyware, or one taken while unlocked,
// reads your screen no matter the cryptography.

$ we tell you this — because the ones who don't are the ones you shouldn't trust

Read the full trust model — what we protect, and where it ends →

// Since 2004

Some philosophies don't age.

YGOOW began two decades ago with one idea: sharing data freely, anonymously, without surveillance. The world finally caught up.

ygoow — manifesto.txt
YGOOW 2004: peer-to-mail. No accounts. No registration.
YGOOW 2026: a messenger. No accounts. No registration.

// "The French faked CAs — ANSSI, 2013.
// The Americans forced backdoors — Apple, 2016.
// The Germans trojaned Skype itself — 2011, so sloppily the CCC laid it bare.
// Encrypt it yourself, and there's nothing to seize — only what you choose to share."

// refs — FR: mozilla.org · theregister.com
// US: epic.org · bbc.com · order (archived)
// DE: ccc.de · report (archived)

$ your key · your rules · everything else is redacted

No phone number. No email. No trace.

YGOOW for Android is on its way. Your key, your rules — everything else is redacted.

Get it on Android — soon